Abstract: This paper examines the enforceability of the duties in the Climate Change Act 2008 which require the UK's GHG emissions to be reduced over time. Section B highlights how the Act's other provisions must be interpreted so as to give proper support to these duties. The paper goes on, in Section C, to dispute objections that have been made to the duties' enforceability -on the grounds that they are 'target duties' or 'non-justiciable'-and argues that the courts can enforce them provided they adopt the amplified role which this new kind of duty requires; by seeking to forge effective but appropriate remedies. Section D suggests what form these remedies might take. Final conclusions are described in Section E.
extent of that constraint is considered here, first in terms of the setting of carbon budgets and secondly in terms of their amendment.
On a literal reading of the Act, the Secretary of State is afforded a relatively wide discretion in setting the level of carbon budgets, something he must do in the twelfth year before the start of each budgetary period. 13 When doing so, he must 'take into account' certain specified considerations. 14 These include but are not limited to: scientific knowledge about climate change; economic and fiscal circumstances; circumstances at European and international level; and the advice which the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) is required under the Act to provide. 15 However this duty to take into account does not, prima facie, translate into a duty to give particular weight to any one consideration over another. 16 Similarly, while carbon budgets must be set 'with a view to meeting' the 2050 target, 17 this wording could suggest that meeting the 2050 target must only be at least one of the Secretary of State's objectives; it need not be his primary purpose.
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Given the centrality of carbon budgeting to the Act as a whole, such discretion in setting carbon budgets would arguably be unduly wide. It would imply that the Secretary of State could prioritise (say) economic considerations above all others in setting a carbon budget, or another consideration not specified in the Act. 19 Could he take into account a personal doubt over the existence of anthropogenic climate change, or a belief that the consequences of climate change would be beneficial to the UK? Might he adopt as his primary purpose in setting a carbon budget not the need to meet the 2050 target but the protection of the UK's oil and gas industry? 20 In practice, we may expect that the Secretary of State's discretion in setting carbon budgets would not be nearly so wide. His decisions will be constrained by the normal bounds of illegality which require that factors taken into consideration in any decision and any purpose for which a decision is made, must not depart too far from the purpose ascribed to the Act as a whole. 21 Furthermore, English law no longer elevates a 'plain meaning' 13 s 4(2)(b). 14 ss 10(1),(2)(a)-(i). 15 s 9(1)(a). 16 Paul Craig, Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 573. 17 ss 8(2)(b), 13(2)(a). 18 If, at least, the treatment of 'with a view to' in R v Dooley [2005] EWCA Crim 3093 [13]- [14] , is followed. 19 The list of mandatory considerations in the Act is not exhaustive: s 10(7). 20 (To borrow wording from s 10(2)(c)). 21 eg Craig (n 16) -respectively: ch. 19-010 (572-575); ch. 19-009 (568-572).
interpretation of a statutory provision above a purposive reading of it. 22 The purpose of the Act will be a matter of construction for the court. 23 In this regard, the 2050 target has such a central prominence in the Act 24 (aside from it being section 1(1)) that it can be expected to play a key role in informing the court's interpretation of the provisions described above;
provisions which are plainly intended to support and facilitate the achievement of the 2050 target. The particular clarity of the Climate Change Act's purpose is another factor likely to constrain the discretion afforded to the Secretary of State in taking decisions pursuant to it.
For these reasons, the hypothetical examples given above would, in all likelihood, be deemed to involve the unlawful exercise of discretion, even though they may not offend a literal reading of the Act.
The weight that the Secretary of State is entitled to give to different considerations is also likely to be constrained by how far each consideration departs from the Act's overall purpose. The Secretary of State will likely be required to take meeting the 2050 target as his primary consideration in setting a 2050 target, rather than it being one among many.
Similar arguments apply to the Secretary of State's power to amend a carbon budget once it has been set. Amendment is permitted if it 'appears to the Secretary of State that, since the budget was originally set (…) there have been significant changes affecting the basis on which the previous decision was made ' . 25 These words imply that the presence of such 'significant changes' will be determined subjectively by the Secretary of State; in other words that they are not 'precedent facts', the established absence of which could lead a court to quash a decision which has been based on their existence. 26 However, such an interpretation has been doubted by the CCC. In 2011, when the level of the fourth carbon budget (relating to the period 2023-2027) was set, 27 the Government stated its intention to revisit it 'by 2014' -and, potentially, to 'revise up our budget' 28 to ensure it remained aligned with the 22 Indeed, statutory interpretation has evolved to the point where 'literalism should give way to purposive interpretation as a matter of course and not exception': Jeff King, Judging Social Rights (CUP 2012) . 24 In addition, a description of section 1 forms the first sentence of the Act's long title. 25 s 21(2). Again, the CCC's advice must be taken into account: s 22(1)(a). Note that similar provision is made for the amendment of the 2050 target -though in this case the 'significant developments' are restricted to those in scientific knowledge about climate change or European or international law or policy (ss 2(1)(a), 2(2)(a) term. In turn, this could help to ensure that carbon budgets chart an appropriate and costeffective course towards the 2050 target. 
C. ENFORCING THE PRIMARY DUTIES

Taking the Primary duties literally
Section 1(1) of the Act is 'concise and clearly drafted'. 46 It imposes a duty in unqualified language. 47 As noted above, statutory interpretation routinely takes into account both literal and purposive meanings. However, in this case, the two align. A literal reading of section 1(1) might even be said to embody the Act's overall purpose. In spite of this, this 'plain meaning' interpretation has been contested.
a) A mere 'target duty'?
The strongest challenge to the primary duties being read as being 'absolute' was expressed by not clearly define the breadth of the authority's discretion. 60 The primary duties contain neither -so in my view they should not be considered as target duties.
Professor Forsyth also appears to be arguing from an alternative perspective. He acknowledges that the primary duties are 'broad, general duties' but he categorises them as target duties nonetheless -since 'a target is not something that you can guarantee, no one can guarantee you are going to hit the bull's eye, it is something you would like to happen but you are not sure it will'. 61 The argument is that a duty which it may not be possible to fulfil
should not be interpreted literally. Two responses can be made to this. First, Professor
Forsyth may well be underestimating the capacity of the Secretary of State to fulfil this duty.
Even if the 'policy levers' at the Secretary of State's disposal might constrain his ability to 'ensure' the necessary outcomes, 62 it seems clear that a duty imposed on the Secretary of State is 'imposed upon government as a whole'. 63 It is difficult to imagine that the wider Government will lack capacity to reduce GHG emissions by the requisite amounts: it will, after all, have control of all policy levers. It should also be noted that proposals and plans to enable carbon budgets to be met must first be prepared fully 11 years in advance of the beginning of a budgetary period. 64 The system of carbon budgeting is designed to ensure long-term decisions are taken to chart a course which is realistic and achievable.
Furthermore, the annual reports mandated by the Act -from the Secretary of State and the CCC 65 -allow for regular policy and course adjustment. I would argue that the image of the Secretary of State aiming hopefully with a bow and arrow at some distant target is not apt.
The Government as a whole will have been planning for many years how to achieve a result which is -as far as any result can be -within its extensive capacity to achieve. 73 The case in question concerned the meaning of a statutory provision which sets a specific deadline for a duty to be fulfilled. 74 Although it also contains qualifying language ('as far as reasonably practicable'), the presence of a specific deadline was enough to distinguish the duty from a target duty.
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The Act's primary duties are a further step removed from target duties. Colin Reid identifies a new, albeit (so far) uncommon, kind of time-limited duty which contains no qualifying terms whatever. 76 He terms such duties 'outcome duties', and the Climate Change Act is his leading example. Outcome duties, he argues:
can be taken at face value as creating a new form of statutory duty, representing a legal innovation through the imposition of unqualified legal duties on Ministers to achieve certain outcomes which can be met only as the result of a complex There is, however, one final potential obstacle to the primary duties being understood as outcome duties: the fact that in 'determining which claims to uphold on the merits, courts will almost irresistibly tend to peek ahead at the remedial consequences and weigh their acceptability'. 78 As discussed in the following sections, the remedial consequences of enforcing a breach of a primary duty may be severe -so this could tempt a court to deny a claim on its merits. However this could only be achieved by 'downgrading' the outcome duties 79 in the face of the kind of arguments made above which caution against it. 80 Instead, the appropriate response, as explored further in Section D, must be to mould the remedial consequences such that they are acceptable so that the duties can be given their proper effect as outcome duties. In what follows I assume that the Act's primary duties will be treated as outcome duties -and I argue that they can and should be effectively enforced.
Contesting the consensus against enforceability
The starting point in this scenario must be that courts will in general be predisposed to seeing that duties are effectively enforced. 81 Indeed, 'ensur[ing] that a public body complies with the law' may be described as the 'essential nature' of public law proceedings. 82 The [resulting] gap in accountability'. 85 The courts should not feel reluctant to adapt to this new type of statutory provision, including by taking on an amplified role if appropriate. For common law constitutionalists, 'evolution' and 'experiment' are fundamental parts of the common law's 'ethos'. 86 Indeed, for those who believe that the courts 'ought to be recognized as the best existing forum for moral/political deliberation' 87 it will be natural that those courts take up the baton of political accountability. Ultra vires proponents will in general favour a more circumscribed judicial role since 'the methodology of ultra vires confines the judicial function to the implementation of Parliament's will' 88 in a way which the common law model does not. However, even on this basis, there can surely be no more legitimate foundation for an innovative judicial response than an innovative expression of Parliament's will -as is found in these outcome duties.
In spite of the persuasive arguments of principle that favour the courts adopting an amplified role in response to the Act, Aileen McHarg has identified a consensus that s.1(1) will not be meaningfully enforced. Her description provides a useful basis for the discussion that follows:
The consensus is that the courts are extremely unlikely to award anything other than declaratory relief, since this would involve them in complex and polycentric issues of policy prioritization and resource allocation which are typically regarded as nonjusticiable. If judicial review is sought before the target/budget date has passed, the action might be regarded as premature; if it is brought afterwards, it might be seen as purely academic (…) 89 McHarg's objections on the basis of non-justiciability are considered at a) -c); those on the basis of timing are dealt with at d). 93 The court will have its answer before it: either the net UK carbon account exceeds the carbon budget in question or it does not. Arriving at such a judgment will not involve complex, polycentric, or policy questions (however defined), nor will it go to the allocation of resources.
a) Non-justiciability
By contrast, at the remedies stage the questions facing the court will be unusually challenging. This is in large part because a statutory duty is in question, not a statutory power.
As Purdue noted in his review of one of the few thorough studies into public law duties:
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[T]he emphasis of the law on public duties is on their positive enforcement, which is why the topic is usually associated with the remedy of mandamus. And it is in the enforcement of public duties that the courts get closest to usurping the task of the administration. Resource Allocation: Here again the connections between different elements of nonjusticiability are apparent. As Paul Daly represents it, the non-justiciability of 'the allocation of scarce resources' is an application of the courts' 'traditional' concerns about complexity, as well as institutional legitimacy. 122 Both King and de Smith's Judicial Review note the close connection between polycentricity and resource allocation; the latter tending to form a sample set of the former. 123 On this analysis, the consideration of resource allocation adds little to the discussion.
King adds nuance, by drawing a distinction between two types of case concerned with resource allocation. First, there are cases where the courts are reviewing the exercise of a power to allocate public resources. 124 These cases, identified according to the nature of the 'input' to a case, will be non-justiciable. 125 On the other hand are cases concerned with 'allocative impact': 'the financial or distributional adjustment made necessary by a court's judgment'. 126 Allocative impact can therefore be a function of the particular remedies ordered in a case (as well, potentially, as the effect of the substantive finding of law). However, King concludes that the presence of allocative impact does not constitute a stand-alone element of non-justiciability. 127 Again, we must conclude that this element of non-justiciabilityresource allocation -operates at the merits stage of a case but does not do so to any appreciable extent at the remedies stage.
b) Justiciable primary duties…
It should not be surprising that doctrines of non-justiciability have the shape that they do given that they have developed in the context of administrative law's focus on powers rather than duties. Just as claims to enforce powers tend to be naturally 'top-heavy' (intense scrutiny of administrative action at the merits stage; relatively straightforward remedies stage) so the doctrines which structure these claims -such as non-justiciability -take a similar shape. The expansion of public law duties and therefore the expansion of claims which are 'bottomheavy' may, in the coming years, demand a change of judicial perspective.
122 Daly (n 102) 173-174. 123 King (n 111) 101: '… the argument that polycentric issues are non-justiciable is most frequently raised in the context of resource allocation disputes'; also King (n 22) 193-194; Woolf and others de Smith's (7th edn) (n 52) 26: 'Most … decisions involving the distribution of limited resources … fall into the category of polycentric decisions'. 124 King (n 80) 198 (cases described as involving 'discretionary allocative decision-making'). 125 ibid 197-8. 126 ibid 197 (emphasis added). 127 It is 'by itself no bar to justiciability': King (n 80) 209.
However, whether it is a product of neglect or design, the apparent fact that nonjusticiability does not operate at the remedies stage of a case 128 has significant implications for the Act's primary duties. Since enforcement of the primary duties does not raise questions of non-justiciability at the merits stage, it follows that, contrary to the consensus identified by
McHarg, 129 the primary duties are not non-justiciable.
If the primary duties are justiciable, this does not, of course, guarantee the outcome of a claim to enforce them. However, it does mean that, in such a claim, a court should not resile from applying the general principles of review with 'full rigour'. 130 On my account, a court in doing so should treat the primary duties as outcome duties, and, it then follows, vindicate the claim on its merits. It is also argued above that a court should feel entitled (if not obliged) to take on an amplified role in enforcing the primary duties, and this must extend to seeking to provide a genuinely effective remedy. 131 How a court might do so is explored in detail in Section D, below.
c) …or Non-justiciable remedies
An alternative conclusion is that a court, faced with a claim to enforce a primary duty, would nonetheless find it to be non-justiciable. It might seek to do so on the basis of there being an element of 'overspill' (so far little acknowledged 132 ) by which the presence of elements of non-justiciability could in fact be informed by the nature of the available remedies. In other words, a claim might be found to be non-justiciable on the basis of a likely remedy appearing to be (for example) polycentric or complex in character. Indeed, there is commentary by Richard Fallon which posits 'a broad linkage between the entire set of justiciability doctrines -including standing, mootness, ripeness, political question, and so forth -and judgments concerning necessary, appropriate, and acceptable judicial remedies'. 133 In particular, Fallon asserts that remedies 'exert a nearly ubiquitous, often unrecognized, and little understood 128 With the possible and partial exception of 'polycentricity'. 129 The contrasting framework of analysis underpinning the consensus position is apparent where Stallworthy notes that the Act's primary duties may be difficult to enforce because 'the courts are generally loathe to interfere with decisions' (emphasis added) exhibiting the elements of non-justiciability discussed here (Stallworthy (n 90) 129). 130 Returning to Daly's formulation of secondary justiciability (n 102). 131 A court might not feel entitled to deny relief following success at the merits stage: Bingham (n 117). 132 At least not explicitly. It may be that in considering non-justiciability to be a barrier to enforcing the primary duties, McHarg and others are (consciously or otherwise) assuming that non-justiciability operates at the remedies stage. This would accord with Fallon's view. However, see Stallworthy (n 129) which suggests otherwise. 133 Fallon (n 78) 635.
influence in the shaping and application of justiciability doctrines'. 134 This idea forms part of a broader thesis 135 which holds that the courts should acknowledge the interconnectedness between the justiciability doctrines that operate at all stages of a claim and seek an 'optimal balance among them'. 136 Viewed through this lens, questions of complexity, polycentricity, or considerations of policy prioritisation or resource allocation, whether they arise at the remedies stage or the merits stage, may (rightly, according to Fallon) influence the court's overall approach to resolving the case before it. In the face of these complexities, the temptation to retreat into non-doctrinalism should be resisted. 137 Seeking to acknowledge and elucidate the connections and overspills between the stages of a claim has the advantage of bringing the 'considerations conditioning restraint … in[to] full view', 138 the value of which, it is hoped, can be seen in the present discussion. If the apparent obstacles to the effective enforcement of the Act's primary duties can be demystified, the way can be made clearer for their being overcome.
Indeed, the central obstacle can now be seen: it is not the 'non-justiciability' (as traditionally understood) 139 of the primary duties, but the difficulty of finding an appropriate remedy. 140 If a remedy can be found which is more appropriate -or, following Fallon's analysis, more 'justiciable' -that obstacle falls away.
d) Overcoming jurisdictional objections
Before proceeding to consider remedies, it is necessary to address McHarg's concerns regarding the timing of a claim, 141 both in terms of prematurity ('ripeness') and lateness ('mootness').
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Ripeness: A claim brought before the end of a budgetary period to enforce a breach of a primary duty would not necessarily be regarded as premature. 143 This is because the duties emissions, which could in principle be exceeded before a budgetary period ended. 145 Even if the net UK carbon account had not yet been exceeded, a court could entertain a judicial review claim if this appeared inevitable 146 or if the Government conceded that it would be exceeded in due course.
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Mootness: Mootness is more likely to be a relevant concern in an action to enforce a primary duty. A judicial review claim must be filed 'promptly; and (…) in any event not later than three months after the grounds to make the case first arose', 148 yet it will typically not be Rigidly applying the (already uncertain 151 ) rules in the above circumstances would be to deny the right of access to justice and therefore offend the rules in principle.
There are good reasons to think that the publication of the net UK carbon account should signal the start of the '3-month clock'. First, this might be analogous to 'notice of a decision'; ruled in Anufrijeva to be when the case first arose. 152 Second, since a primary duty will be breached by the effect of cumulative (in)action, it is hard to imagine what other point in time could be taken as the start point. Lastly, the breach itself would arguably only occur when the net UK carbon account 'came into existence' -presumably by its being made publicly available after the end of the budgetary period. Indeed, until it is published, the Government is able to make adjustments to the carbon account; 153 potentially making good what would otherwise constitute a breach. Whether or not, as McHarg suggests, a claim made after the end of a budgetary period might be 'purely academic' will depend upon the remedies that a court is able to order; discussed in the following section.
D. FINDING AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY
In 1973, Lord Denning said: 'We live in an age when Parliament has placed statutory duties on government departments and public authorities -for the benefit of the public -but has provided no remedy for the breach of them'. 154 Since then, remedies have failed to expand to fill the role required of them, 155 something underlined now by the advent of outcome duties.
As argued above, it is the unavailability of an effective and appropriate remedy which represents the primary challenge for the enforcement of the Act's primary duties. There is also, as noted, 'a strong argument for the amplification of the courts' role' to ensure that the primary duties are appropriately enforced, 156 which must involve forging an acceptable and effective remedy.
Remedies under the Act
It is first necessary to address those arguments which hold that the courts should refrain from ordering effective remedies in this context. Perhaps the most common basis for this view is More specifically, the Government in the course of the Act's pre-legislative scrutiny explicitly denied that political accountability was intended to oust legal accountability. 160 Arguably, a judicial remedy should not be awarded where a political remedy would be as 'convenient, beneficial and effective'. 161 By this measure, however, a statement to Parliament would fall far short of any substantive remedy. A declaration might be comparable in these terms; however, such a remedy should be avoided for the reasons given below.
The courts should not be discouraged by the lack of 'hard-edged' compliance procedures in the Act, which might ordinarily 'lead to an exceptional reluctance to fashion corrective remedies'. 162 On the Government's account, calls for such procedures 163 were rejected because they might have interfered with an effective judicial response: 'attempting to set out specific sanctions carries a risk that whatever sanction was specified might be less stringent than one which could be prescribed by a court of law'. 164 Similarly, the then Secretary of State, David Miliband MP highlighted the need for the Act to reserve for judges 'maximum flexibility' to order 'appropriate sanctions', and the value of thereby creating an 'additional fear' among ministers. 165 The status of evidence given by Government in prelegislative scrutiny is generally far from settled. 166 While in general Parliamentary material
should not be used to aid statutory construction, 167 Government statements of the kind quoted, if they have any effect at all, should embolden a court to consider fashioning innovative and 'stringent' corrective remedies.
Finally, there is a risk that a court might order a mere declaration -that a Secretary of State had breached a primary duty -as a remedy. However, doing so would 'add nothing to the reporting provisions already in the [Act]' 168 and it would risk giving the same impression as awarding no remedy at all; namely that the court was 'impotent … [since giving a] judgment not accompanied by an effectual remedy would risk that appearance'. 169 For these reasons a declaration should be avoided.
The court's remedies
A failure to perform a duty will generally be most effectively remedied by a positive injunction or a mandatory order; the former probably being preferred on account of the greater flexibility it would afford. 170 notions of non-justiciability do not apply to remedies, the court is, in principle, free to overlook these characteristics. However, this article has also argued that the effect of such characteristics might well constitute an obstacle to effective enforcement, whether described in terms of non-justiciability or not.
A more creative, flexible and co-operative approach to remedies may be required. For example:
i) The court could order certain general steps to be taken, leaving the details to be decided by the Government. 187 In this way, 'ownership' of the most nonjusticiable elements of a remedy might be retained by the Government.
ii) 'One solution might be for the courts to evolve more flexible remedies, such as requiring a public authority to report back to the court as to how it is carrying out its public duties'. 188 iii) More punitive measures could perhaps (at the same time) be imposed in 'suspended' form, to allow the Government a chance to take more constructive remedial measures.
To apply these suggestions to the example above: instead of a court ordering investment in a specific programme of action, it could order the Government to develop such a programme (perhaps within constraints outlined by the court), and to demonstrate to the court at certain intervals how that programme was being implemented. Such an approach would not be entirely without precedent. 190 In the meantime, the court could allow excess emissions to be 'rolled forward' into future periods (akin to proposal iii, above) so that total emissions would not increase, while also reserving its ability to impose more punitive measures if the Government failed to comply with the court's remedial measures by a predetermined time.
The purpose of this example is not to second-guess what a court might order in the event that a carbon budget was breached, but to demonstrate that it would be within its capacity to order a remedy that was both constitutionally appropriate and genuinely effective.
E. CONCLUSION
To return to Lord Denning's quote, 191 there is in general a mismatch between the extent of public duties and the means that the courts have at their disposal to enforce them. The emergence of outcome duties (of which the Act's primary duties are examples) only exacerbates this problem, and demands an 'amplified' judicial response. I have argued that the duties under the Act which determine how carbon budgets are set and amended should be interpreted purposively. This will help to ensure that the carbon budgets are anchored sufficiently strongly to the 2050 target. Although the obstacles to the effective enforcement of the Act's primary duties are routinely described by commentators in terms of nonjusticiability, I have suggested that this framework of analysis does not, at least in its usual form, provide a satisfactory explanation of the real obstacles to enforcement. This is because non-justiciability tends not (overtly at least) to 'operate' at the remedies stage of a judicial review claim, yet it is at this stage that the obstacles to the enforcement of the Act's primary duties are found. Therefore, on any analysis, the prospect of effective enforcement of the Act's primary duties depends on the courts' willingness to craft effective and appropriate remedies. I have sought to demonstrate that such remedies need not be beyond the capacity of a court which in principle accepts the need for them. The Climate Change Act is noteworthy for establishing long-term and unambiguous duties on the Secretary of State to achieve quantified GHG emissions reductions by certain times. These duties are not only politically powerful, they are also capable of effective legal enforcement.
